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ABSTRACT 
In 2019, the Alaska Supreme Court overruled the twenty-year-old precedent 
established in State v. Coon that limited appellate review of trial courts’ 
rulings on the validity and admissibility of scientific evidence in a Daubert 
context. In State v. Sharpe, the court rejected the abuse of discretion standard, 
instead applying a more stringent de novo review in evaluating the trial courts’ 
determinations about the reliability of the scientific theory or technique 
underlying an expert’s testimony. Sharpe arose from three consolidated cases, 
all of which included evidence from the identical type of polygraph test admitted 
or excluded based on a single evidentiary hearing on the validity of the 
polygraph test. These conflicting and arbitrary outcomes demonstrated the real 
capacity for inconsistencies that appellate courts would not have been able to 
correct for under the old abuse of discretion standard, highlighting the very 
concerns raised by the dissent in Coon. Now, under this more stringent 
appellate standard, it is all the more important for practitioners to develop 
comprehensive records surrounding scientific evidence. In developing these 
trial records, practitioners should look to the supreme court’s analysis in 
Sharpe for guidance on some of the most important factors appellate courts 
will likely rely on in their review. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In State v. Sharpe,1 the Alaska Supreme Court considered the appeal 
of three consolidated criminal cases in which defendants—Thomas 
Alexander, Jyzyk Sharpe, and Jeffery Holt—sought to introduce 
comparison question technique (CPT) polygraph examinations into 
evidence.2 The same expert conducted the CPT examination for each 
defendant.3 For each case, the superior court relied on the single, two-day 
evidentiary hearing from Alexander’s case regarding the admissibility of 
his polygraph examination under the Daubert/Coon-standard.4 Based on 
the record from this evidentiary hearing, the court admitted the 
polygraph examination in two cases and denied admission in the third.5 
When all three cases were appealed, the court of appeals urged the 
supreme court to re-examine the standard of review under Daubert/Coon 
because application of the standard required affirmation of the superior 
court evidentiary rulings in all three cases, despite the inherent 
contradiction in affirming all three.6 The supreme court held that 
Daubert/Coon determinations of whether the underlying scientific theory 
or technique is scientifically valid should be subject to de novo review by 
the appellate court.7 In overturning the Coon abuse of discretion standard 
for Daubert determinations, the supreme court acknowledged one of its 
greatest concerns in Coon regarding the setting of an abuse of discretion 
standard: the appellate record.8 
This Comment addresses the practical impact of State v. Sharpe for 
practitioners. The new standard of review for Daubert-style 
determinations requires that trial-level practitioners ensure the record on 
 
 1.  435 P.3d 887 (Alaska 2019). 
 2.  Id. at 889–91. 
 3.  Id. at 889. 
 4.  Id. at 890. The Daubert/Coon standard refers to two cases:  
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); and State v. Coon, 
974 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1999). In Daubert, the Supreme Court articulated five non-
exclusive factors to be used in determining the admissibility of an expert witness’s 
scientific testimony. 509 U.S. at 593–95. The Alaska Supreme Court adopted the 
Daubert standard in Coon. 974 P.2d at 402. 
 5.  Sharpe, 435 P.3d at 889. 
 6.  Id. at 891–92. 
 7.  Id. at 900. 
 8.  See id. at 899 (“We do not take these concerns lightly: the record on appeal 
is limited to the testimony and exhibits in the superior court’s case file, so there is 
a non-negligible risk that reviewing the validity of scientific evidence de novo 
could lead us or the court of appeals to decide a case involving the admissibility 
of scientific evidence based on incomplete information.”). 
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appeal is as complete as practicably possible, as the record is now subject 
to a more searching review by the appellate court.9 Part II details the case 
histories of both State v. Sharpe and its predecessor, State v. Coon. Part III 
discusses the important practical impact of State v. Sharpe for trial-level 
practitioners and notes key aspects of the record that will likely be 
reviewed by appellate courts. 
II. CASE DESCRIPTIONS 
The supreme court first considered the standard of review for 
scientific evidence admitted under Daubert in Alaska state courts in State 
v. Coon.10 In Coon, the defendant, George Coon, was found guilty of 
making terroristic telephone calls.11 In securing the conviction, the State 
retained a voice analysis expert to complete a voice spectrographic 
analysis of the calls.12 The expert compared the voice on the answering 
machine with voice exemplars provided by Coon.13 On appeal, the 
supreme court in Coon faced the issue of whether to adopt the recently-
decided Daubert standard or to retain the previous requirements under 
Frye v. United States14 for the admission of scientific evidence through 
experts.15 Ultimately, the supreme court adopted the Daubert test, 
rejecting Frye as inconsistent with the Alaska Rules of Evidence.16 Further, 
the court applied an abuse of discretion standard for reviewing Daubert 
rulings, stating that “[s]uch rulings are best left to the discretion of the 
trial court.”17 
The lone dissenter in Coon, Justice Fabe, concurred in part with the 
judgement, agreeing with the majority’s adoption of the Daubert standard 
for scientific evidence.18 Justice Fabe further agreed that abuse of 
discretion was the correct standard of review with respect to “the 
relevance of scientific evidence to particular cases,” but believed the court 
adopted the incorrect standard of review for the “validity of such 
techniques . . . because the question of a technique’s scientific validity is a 
legal issue that normally does not depend on case-sensitive factual 
determinations.”19 Further, she warned that the abuse of discretion 
 
 9.  See infra Part III.   
 10.  974 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1999).  
 11.  Id. at 388.  
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
 15.  Coon, 974 P.2d at 389. 
 16.  Id. at 395. 
 17.  Id. at 399. 
 18.  Id. at 403 (Fabe, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 19.  Id.  
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standard would cause inconsistencies in the admission of scientific 
evidence that appellate courts would be unable to resolve.20 The majority 
disagreed with this critique, countering that a de novo standard would 
not “adequately take account of the reality of the judicial process and the 
variable state of science.”21 The majority was particularly concerned that 
the record on appeal would not contain adequate and relevant data 
regarding the scientific method at issue.22 
In Sharpe, the supreme court revisited the Coon standard of review 
for the admissibility of scientific evidence under Daubert.23 Sharpe 
addressed the three cases, consolidated on appeal, in which the 
defendants—Thomas Alexander, Jyzyk Sharpe, and Jeffery Holt—all 
sought to admit a comparison question technique polygraph examination 
into evidence.24 The superior court held a two-day evidentiary hearing on 
the admissibility of Alexander’s polygraph examination, determining 
that the evidence met the Daubert/Coon requirements for scientific 
validity.25 Subsequently, in Sharpe’s case, the State moved to exclude his 
polygraph examination.26 The superior court did not hold a new 
evidentiary hearing on Sharpe’s evidence.27 Instead, the court relied on 
the record established in Alexander’s evidentiary hearing.28 The court 
then admitted the polygraph examination on the basis of the same 
reasoning in Alexander.29 A third superior court judge examined the same 
record and order from Alexander’s evidentiary hearing to determine the 
admissibility of Holt’s polygraph examination.30 On review of the same 
record from State v. Alexander,31 the court in State v. Holt32 determined the 
evidence was not sufficiently reliable to be admitted and excluded it.33 
Parties filed appeals in all three cases.34 
The court of appeals affirmed the superior court holding in all three 
 
 20.  Id. at 404. (“Application of an abuse of discretion standard of review to 
the validity of scientific technique w[ould] most likely lead to inconsistent 
treatment of similarly situated claims.”). 
 21.  Id. at 399 (majority opinion). 
 22.  See id. (citing State v. Alberico, 861 P.2d 192 (N.M. 1993)) (noting the New 
Mexico Supreme Court’s rejection of de novo review of scientific validity with the 
same concerns).  
 23.  State v. Sharpe, 435 P.3d 887, 887 (Alaska 2019).  
 24.  Id. at 889–91.  
 25.  Id. at 890. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. at 891. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  State v. Alexander, No. 3AN-09-11088 CR (Alaska Super. Ct. 2015).  
 32.  State v. Holt, No. 3HO-11-515CR (Alaska Super. Ct. 2014).  
 33.  Sharpe, 435 P.3d at 891. 
 34.  Id. at 891–92. 
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cases, finding that there was no abuse of discretion under the Coon 
standard but urging the supreme court to reconsider the standard of 
review established in Coon. Specifically, the court of appeals underscored 
that the deferential standard meant the reviewing court could not correct 
discrepancies where reasonable persons can and do differ on evaluating 
the validity of scientific evidence.35 
On review, the supreme court consolidated Alexander, Sharpe, and 
Holt.36 The court considered whether to revisit the abuse of discretion 
standard established in Coon, as urged by the court of appeals.37 It held 
that the prior standard of review understated the potential for 
inconsistent rulings on the admissibility of scientific evidence to a level 
that undermined the integrity of the court.38 Noting that Justice Fabe’s 
dissent in Coon correctly identified that the abuse of discretion standard 
would likely lead to inconsistent application in similar situations, the 
court further found that a number of commentators had proposed a 
similar standard to Justice Fabe’s critiques.39 While all federal circuits 
have adopted the abuse of discretion standard, several state courts have 
adopted a “stricter” standard of review.40 
In overruling the Coon standard, the supreme court reasoned the 
posture of these three cases, which relied on the same evidentiary hearing 
and exact same record but arrived at different determinations of 
admissibility, precisely demonstrated the inconsistency foreseen by 
Justice Fabe.41 The court found it had been too dismissive in Coon of the 
potential for inconsistent rulings and the impact those rulings would have 
on the integrity of the judicial process.42 In overruling Coon, the court 
imposed a new hybrid standard: appellate courts must apply a clear error 
standard to preliminary factual determinations but exercise de novo 
review when evaluating whether the underlying scientific theories or 
techniques are scientifically valid under Daubert.43 This independent 
judgment is to be based on “the evidence presented and the scientific 
literature available,” subject to de novo review.44 
 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id. at 892. The State and Defendants Shape and Alexander filed cross-
petitions to the supreme court. Id. The court of appeals severed and certified the 
polygraph question in Holt, as the supreme court had already granted review in 
the other two cases. Id. The supreme court accepted certification and consolidated 
all three cases. Id. 
 37.  Id. at 893. 
 38.  Id. at 898.  
 39.  Id. at 896. 
 40.  Id. at 897. 
 41.  Id. at 898. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Id. at 889–90. 
 44.  Id. at 900. 
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III. ANALYSIS 
The supreme court’s ruling in State v. Sharpe will have an important 
practical impact for trial-level practitioners who seek to introduce 
testimony from experts that must meet Daubert-style criteria. Specifically, 
the shift to de novo review will require practitioners to ensure the record 
on appeal is as complete as practically possible.45 Under the old abuse of 
discretion standard, the state of the record was not as important because 
the appellate court conducted a less searching analysis.46 The de novo 
review standard, however, obligates the appellate court to conduct a 
complete, independent review of the evidence in the record.47 Given the 
more intensive nature of this new standard, a comprehensive record is 
even more important now than when an abuse of discretion standard 
applied. 
In initially settling on the abuse of discretion standard, the court in 
Coon emphasized the need for a clear and complete record on appeal 
under a de novo standard.48 Specifically, the court expressed concern that 
the record on appeal cannot be guaranteed to contain all the relevant, 
recent data.49 Further, appellate courts might not always have access to 
adequate scientific literature when exercising independent review.50 In 
rejecting the Coon abuse of discretion standard, the court in Sharpe 
acknowledged the same concerns.51 However, the supreme court did not 
find the issue dispositive in Sharpe because the trial courts are also limited 
to ruling based on information in the record and because appellate courts 
would have additional time to review literature independently to 
mitigate a poor record.52 Thus, a poor record on appeal is still an issue, 
just one that appellate courts can overcome. 
 
 45.  Id. at 889. 
 46.  Under abuse of discretion, the court will only overturn the trial court’s 
decision if it was arbitrary, unreasonable, or absurd. ALASKA COURT SYS., SELF-
HELP SERVICES: APPEALS (2018), http://www.courts.alaska.gov/shc/appeals/ 
appellantsopeningbrief.htm#15. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  See State v. Coon, 974 P.2d 386, 399 (Alaska 1999) (citing State v. Alberico, 
861 P.2d 192, 169–70 (N.M. 1993)) (noting the New Mexico Supreme Court’s 
rejection of de novo review of Daubert qualifications because the assumption a 
clear record on appeal exists is unrealistic). 
 49.   See id. (adopting the reasoning of the New Mexico Supreme Court). 
 50.  See id. (adopting the reasoning of the New Mexico Supreme Court 
regarding the risks associated with de novo appellate review of admissions of 
scientific evidence where the record lacks adequate scientific literature). 
 51.  State v. Sharpe, 435 P.3d 889, 899 (Alaska 2019) (“[T]here is a non-
negligible risk that reviewing the validity of scientific evidence de novo could lead 
us or the court of appeals to decide a case involving the admissibility of scientific 
evidence based on incomplete information.”). 
 52.  Id. 
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As a result, it is important that trial attorneys create a strong record 
for potential appeals. The supreme court’s analysis in Sharpe can serve as 
a guide for practitioners in creating such a record.53 The court’s analysis 
suggests appellate review will focus on the following key aspects of a 
record. First is the experts’ testimony, even when the testimony simply 
cited to other studies.54 It is as important as ever to ensure the clarity of 
the experts’ testimony at trial. As the court in Coon cautioned, the variance 
in experts’ presentation skills can impact courts’ understanding of the 
validity of a technique and therefore their decision on whether to admit 
evidence as valid.55 
Second is the review of academic literature independent of the 
literature mentioned by experts or entered into evidence.56 This review of 
outside literature suggests that trial courts should be willing to review 
additional academic material, at least if it is presented by the parties, 
given that trial-level decisions must be made in a short timeframe.57 At a 
minimum, practitioners should be aware of the full field of literature and 
take measures to respond to literature that counters their position given 
that appellate courts may review it, even if opposing counsel does not 
introduce it. The peer review factor is the one exception to this willingness 
to review outside literature.58 As a result, practitioners must be careful to 
introduce any instances of peer review of the method about which they 
seek to have an expert testify, although given that this is not grounded in 
any specific reasoning, this may be subject to later change. 
Finally, the court considered “[o]ther relevant factors,” including the 
“danger of a hidden litigation motive” factor in parts of the record that 
indicated potential witness bias.59 Practitioners need not do anything 
more than prepare for cross examination of their expert as usual, since 
witness bias is a common ground for cross examination.60 That said, the 
 
 53.  Id. at 902–08. 
 54.  The supreme court reviewed the experts’ testimony for every Daubert 
factor. Id. at 902–08, 907 nn.147–50. 
 55.  See Coon, 974 P.2d at 399 (quoting language from the New Mexico 
Supreme Court’s decision concerning variances in proof of validity of scientific 
techniques based on different presentations of such proof). 
 56.  The supreme court reviewed independent academic literature for every 
Daubert factor except for peer review. Sharpe, 435 P.3d at 902–08. 
 57.  The supreme court’s ruling suggests appellate courts should review 
outside literature when conducting de novo review. Since de novo review is 
simply a new review of the trial court’s decision, trial courts should likewise be 
able to review outside literature. 
 58.  Sharpe, 435 P.3d at 904 (only mentioning studies cited by the expert). The 
peer review factor examines whether the scientific technique has been examined 
in peer review studies. Id. 
 59.  Id. at 908. 
 60.  31A AM. JUR. 2D Expert and Opinion Evidence § 59 (2020). 
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supreme court’s analysis suggests citing numerous studies by one’s own 
expert can be a double-edged sword. Typically, the fact that a proposed 
expert has conducted studies in the area supports her qualification as an 
expert.61 Here, however, the supreme court considered the same fact to be 
further evidence of the expert’s potential bias.62 
IV. CONCLUSION 
State v. Sharpe provides important guidance to trial-level 
practitioners on preserving a comprehensive record in preparation for a 
more rigorous appellate standard of review. Sharpe’s shift to de novo 
review means that appellate courts will now conduct a more intensive 
review of the record when examining expert qualifications that must meet 
a Daubert-style test. Dating back to Coon, the supreme court has expressed 
concern about the need for a clear and complete record on appeal. 
Helpfully, the supreme court’s de novo review in Sharpe provides 
guidance on how to establish such a comprehensive record. First, expert 
testimony is always critical to the Daubert analysis. Second, the appellate 
courts will review outside academic literature so trial-level practitioners 
should be prepared to potentially introduce helpful literature beyond 
what was relied upon by their expert and should be prepared to counter 
adverse academic literature, even if it is not raised before the trial court 
by the opposing party. Finally, the de novo review standard amplifies the 
traditional importance of preparing experts for direct and cross 
examinations; direct examinations need to be clearer so that appellate 
courts can later understand the expert’s importance, and cross 
examinations can bring out independent factors the appellate courts may 
consider in deciding whether an expert meets the Daubert-style 
requirements. Ultimately, by developing these factors considered by the 
supreme court in Sharpe, trial-level practitioners can preserve a 
comprehensive record ready to withstand a more rigorous standard of 
review in a post-Coon appeal. 
 
 
 61.  See id. § 40 (2020) (stating expert qualification is based on experts having 
superior knowledge of the subject matter to the general public). 
 62.  Sharpe, 435 P.3d at 908. 
